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Abstract: Smart contracts provide a quandary for contract law remedies. The self-enforcing
nature of smart contracts implies that there is little possibility for breach and thus, little need
or opportunity to apply contract law remedies. This article explores if this is really the case.
It concludes that contract law remains applicable to smart contracts relating to the enforce-
ability of its terms based on legality, public policy, and contracts policing doctrines. In such
cases, post hoc judicial or arbitral claims remain likely and the dispute resolution bodies
would seek to apply contract remedies. In order to diminish instances of litigation or
arbitration the smart contract should include self-remedying or internal measures (remedies).
The article divides internal measures into proactive and reactive measures. These measures
should be considered in the drafting of a smart contract in order to diminish resort to
contract remedies. In the end, contract law and contract remedies will remain important
as default law. In addition, like smart contracts, some of contract law rules are immutable
and cannot be made obsolete by blockchain technology.
Résumé: Les contrats intelligents constituent un dilemme pour les recours en matière
contractuelle. La nature auto-applicable des contrats intelligents implique qu’il y a peu de
possibilités de rupture de contrat et par là, peu de nécessités ou d’occasions d’appliquer
les recours prévus en droit des contrats. Le présent article recherche si c’est vraiment le
cas. Il conclut que le droit des contrats demeure applicable aux contrats intelligents en ce
qui concerne l’applicabilité de ses modalités basées sur la légalité, l’intérêt public et les
doctrines de ‘contracts policing’. Dans de tels cas les recours judiciaires ou arbitraux ‘post
hoc’ restent possibles et les organismes de résolution de conflits chercheront à appliquer
les recours prévus en matière contractuelle. Afin de réduire les cas de litiges ou d’arbi-
trages, le contrat intelligent devrait inclure des mesures autorégulatrices ou des mesures
internes (recours). Cet article divise les mesures internes en mesures proactives et mesures
réactives. Ces mesures devraient être prises en considération dans l’élaboration d‘un
contrat intelligent dans le but de réduire l’utilisation de voies de recours en matière
contractuelle. Finalement le droit des contrats et les voies de recours en matière contrac-
tuelle garderont un rôle important en tant que réglementation par défaut. De plus,
comme les contrats intelligents, certaines règles du droit des contrats sont immuables et
ne peuvent être rendues obsolètes par la technologie de la blockchain.
Zusammenfassung: Smart Contracts erzeugen ein Dilemma für vertragliche Rechtsbehelfe.
Die sich selbst durchsetzende Natur der Smart Contracts impliziert, dass nur wenig Raum für
Vertragsbruch besteht und daher auch nur wenig Notwendigkeit oder Möglichkeit der
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Anwendung vertraglicher Rechtsbehelfe besteht. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob dem wirklich
so ist. Er kommt zu dem Schluss, dass Vertragsrecht auf Smart Contracts anwendbar bleibt
in Bezug auf die Durchsetzbarkeit seiner Klauseln vor dem Hintergrund von Rechtmäßigkeit,
öffentlicher Ordnung, und vertragsrechtlicher Rechtsgrundsätze. In diesen Fällen bleibt die
nachträgliche gerichtliche oder schiedsgerichtliche Geltendmachung von Ansprüchen
wahrscheinlich und die entsprechenden Stellen würden eine Anwendung vertraglicher
Rechtsbehelfe anstreben. Um gerichtliche oder schiedsrechtliche Streitigkeiten zu vermeiden,
sollte der Smart Contract eigene ‘self-help’-Rechtsbehelfe oder entsprechende interne
Vorrichtungen (remedies) vorsehen. Der Beitrag teilt solche internen Vorrichtungen in proak-
tive und reaktive ein. Sie sollten bei der Erstellung eines Smart Contracts berücksichtigt
werden, um den Rückgriff auf vertragliche Rechtsbehelfe zu vermeiden. Es bleibt jedoch
dabei, dass gesetzliches Vertragsrecht und vertragliche Rechtsbehelfe eine wichtige Rolle
beibehalten. Darüber hinaus bleiben einige Grundsätze des Vertragsrechts unabdingbar
und könne auch durch Blockchain-Technologie nicht ersetzt werden.
1. Introduction
1 This article will examine the impact of smart contracts’ ability to self-perform,
self-enforce, and self-remedy on the applicability of contract law and contract
remedies. Smart contracts,1 those coupled with blockchain technology, have cre-
ated visions of self-executing, self-enforcing, and self-remedying contracts that
eliminate the need for courts or arbitral tribunals to apply contract law to disputes.
The question is whether smart contracts are really contracts under traditional
definitions of contracts? The State of Nevada on 5 June 2017 enacted a law that
provides a framework for the use of blockchain technology and the enforceability of
smart contracts.2 The new law openly recognizes blockchain as a means to the
creation of contracts. It does not expressly state that smart contracts are contracts
under contract law, but it implicitly achieves this recognition by approving block-
chain as an appropriate means to creating contracts.3
1 A simply definition of smart contracts is stated as follows: ‘Smart contracts are self-executing
electronic instructions drafted in computer code. This allows a computer to “read” the contract
and, in many cases, effectuate the instruction – hence the “smartness” of the contract.’
R. O’SHIELDS, ‘Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain’, 21. N.C.B.I. (North
Carolina Banking Institute) 2017, p (177) at 179. Smart contracts are different than ordinary
electronic contracts in that the actual agreement is embodied in computer code, rather than
English or another traditional language. See N. SZABO, ‘Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for
Digital Markets’, 1996, http://szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html (coined the term
‘smart contracts’) (accessed 17 June 2018).
2 Senate Bill No. 398 (25 May 2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/79th2017/Bills/SB/SB398_
R2.pdf (accessed 17 June 2018). See generally, Gayle M. HYMAN & M. DIGESTI, ‘New Nevada Legislation
Recognizes Blockchain and Smart Contract Technologies’, 23. N.L (Nevada Lawyer) 2017, p (13).
3 The recognition of ‘blockchain as a means’ is clear because the new law is actually an amendment
to the ‘Uniform Electronic Transactions Act’ which recognized electronic records, as well as
electronic signatures or attribution, as satisfying any writing requirements (statue of frauds).
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2 It is best to start the current discussion with defining three important concepts—
self-enforcement, self-help remedies, and ‘other remedies.’ Self-enforcement can be
analogized to the remedy of specific performance. Self-help remediesmay be analogized,
in some cases, as a form of the remedy of injunction, such as the disablement of the time
of use of the subject of the contract. Other remedies refer to the menu of remedies
provided under contract law and their continued position as default law. The remaining
importance of contract law remedies is premised on the view that no matter the degree
of self-enforcement and the creation of self-help remedies in smart contracts, the parties
will continue to have the ability to seek redress before courts and arbitral tribunals.
3 The allure of smart contracts may be a reflection of the perceived shortcomings
of written contracts and contract law: (1) contract drafting either leads to incom-
plete contracts, ‘artificial complexity,’ or both; (2) the unevenness of contract
interpretation; and (3) uncertainty of contract remedies.4 These criticisms of
traditional contracts are not without merit but they also lead to potentially reci-
procal criticisms of smart contracts. First, do smart contracts suffer from artificial
simplicity, does the translation of words to code and re-translation in case of
disputes lead to additional interpretive problems, and do smart contracts solve
the issue of the uncertainty of remedies? Second, are smart contracts complete
contracts or are they complete only because of their simplicity?
4 Just as the false argument that word contracts can be made to be clear and
complete, the completeness of smart contracts is an illusion.5 One commentator
noted that: ‘Terms of contracts, which are more complex than the immediate
transfer of value and property are likely to not be efficiently encoded.’6 There
remains ‘a risk of divergence expressed in natural language between the meaning
of the original contractual provision and its expression in code.’7 If word contracts
are hopelessly incomplete, how can word contracts translated into code be any less
incomplete? In the end, contract remedies will always play a role since complete-
ness is illusionary given the unpredictability of future events and code is no
different than the use of words since both are creations of human beings, meaning
that perfect completeness will never by achievable. The issue analysed in this article
4 J. SKLAROFF, ‘Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility’, 166. UPLR (University of Pennsylvania
Law Review) 2017, p (263) at 265.
5 G. CORDERO-MOSS, ‘Interpretation of Contracts in International Commercial Arbitration: Diversity
on More than One Level’, 22. ERPL (European Review of Private Law) 2014, p (13) (sufficiently
detailed and clear contracts can be interpreted internally ‘without them being influenced by any
governing law. This impression has proven to be illusionary’).
6 S. FARRELL, H. MACHIN & R. HINCHLIFFE, ‘Lost and found in smart contract translation—considera-
tions in transitioning to automation in legal architecture’ (King & Wood Mallesons, Australia), p 3,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Papers_for_Programme/14-FARRELL_and_
MACHIN_and_HINCHLIFFE-Smart_Contracts.pdf (accessed 22 April 2018).
7 FARRELL, MACHIN & HINCHLIFFE.
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is whether a complete set of remedies can be incorporated into smart contracts to
preclude the need for contract law remedies in a default role. The article concludes
that this is unlikely because of the immutability of some contract law rules, change
of circumstances, and the continued right to bring post-enforcement claims.
However, internal remedial provisions may fill in a void where enforcement of
traditional remedies are not practical or too costly.
5 The optimistic prognostications of the potential of smart contracts to be self-
executing, freeing business transactions from the transaction costs of court and
arbitral proceedings, and the formal application of contract law, raises numerous
questions.8 Are smart contracts really smart or are they simple9 in what they can
do? Smart contracts have already proven themselves as efficient in financial trans-
actions, but can they be made efficient in complex contract scenarios? Are smart
contracts really contracts or simply Internet-like in serving as a means of commu-
nication and not as a self-executing substantive private law? No matter whether
smart contracts are viewed as fully self-referential contracts or merely as a techni-
que of communicating or effectuating performance (within the domain of contract
law) are additional regulatory mechanisms needed to police problems created by
this new ‘contract-type?’10 Finally, does the use of self-help remedies unduly
narrow the remedial menu and act as a device for abuse, especially in cases of
change of circumstances?
6 It is in the area of self-enforcement and remedies where the vision of smart
contracts confronts the reality of contract law and business lawyering. Smart contracts
need to be drafted by lawyers, focused on client interests and not technological
prowess. In order for lawyers to best serve their clients, they would have to learn to
write computable code, while judges would have to learn codes to interpret the
contract or rely on an expert interpretation. Assuming that there is only a single
interpretation of a computer code, does the issue over the correct or reasonable
legal interpretation of contracts miraculously resolve itself? Put, simply is this a step
too far in the advancement of the self-executing, self-enforcing smart contracts? Code
will need to be converted into words, which reengages the same quandaries that have
persisted in contract interpretation over the centuries.
8 J. FAIRFIELD, ‘Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection’, 71. WLLRO (Washington
& Lee Law Review Online) 2014, p (35) at 39, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-
online/vol71/iss2/3 (accessed 17 June 2018).
9 An example of the coding of standard terms involves the coding of the International Chamber of
Commerce’s Incoterms (Incochain). R. DE CARIA, ‘A Digital Revolution in International Trade? The
International Framework for Blockchain Technologies’, p 7, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
congress/Papers_for_Programme/5-DE_CARIA-A_Digital_Revolution_in_International_Trade.
pdf (accessed 25 June 2018).
10 K. LLEWELLYN, The Common Law Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1960).
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7 If smart contracts are completely self-enforcing, then there is no need for a
remedial scheme. If smart contracts are not completely enforcing, can smart contracts
provide a self-contained remedial system? Even if that is possible, the argument here is
that self-enforcement or self-remedialization would still need to conform to the immu-
table rules of contract law. An unenforceable clause under contract law cannot be made
enforceable simply by embedding it into a code. A contract term that is considered
illegal or against public policy cannot be made legal in a smart contract. Finally, if a
smart contract is too simple, then it may fail as to indefiniteness of terms.11 In the end,
the judicial remedies of adjustment (reformation) or voidance (rescission) will play the
same roles in coded contracts as they do in language contracts. Ultimately, courts will
remain relevant in the enforcement and interpretation of smart contracts.
8 Part 2 will examine the relationship between smart contracts and contract law,
as well as the future complications posed by artificial intelligence on the self-
enforcing nature of smart contracts and whether contract law will play any role in
such contracts. Part 3 looks at the issue of enforcement and remedies in smart
contracts including the idea of the enforcement of self-help remedies incorporated
into smart contracts and the potential for abuse of self-help remedies. Part 4
provides concluding remarks on the continuing role of contract law remedies in
the era of smart contracts.
2. Smart Contracts and Contract Law
9 The use of smart contracts can never entirely avoid contract law. Contract law will
remain important, especially in areas, such as legal rights, obligations, and remedies.
The need to translate digital code to words in order to be interpreted by judges and
lawyers can create problems of translation (incorrect coding and decoding), just as
words transplanted from one language to another may create issues of meaning. Also,
coding and self-enforcement presents a level of rigidity at odds with modern relational
contract law.12 The modern contract is an amalgamation of fixed terms and flexible
standards. Contracts and contract law provide flexible terms and doctrines, such as
11 The indefiniteness of a contract may lead to its unenforceability (as a non-contract):
Certainty as to what constitutes the contractual terms (and whether they are comprehen-
sive enough) is often a critical factor necessary to establish the formation of a legally
binding contract in many jurisdictions. Smart contracts … may not satisfy such
requirements.
Norton Rose Fulbright White Paper, ‘Can Smart Contracts be Legally Binding Contracts: Key
Findings’, p 4, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/norton-rose-fulbright–r3-smart-con
tracts-white-paper-key-findings-nov-2016-144554.pdf (accessed 17 June 2018).
12 ‘The immutability [of smart contracts] means that [the] contracts cannot keep up with changing
circumstances.’ ERIC TJONG TJIN TAI, ‘Formalizing Contract Law for Smart Contracts’, Tilburg
Private Law Working Papers No. 06/2017, http://www.ssrn.com/link/Tilburg-Private-Law.html
(accessed 17 June 2018).
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renegotiation and reopener clauses (change of circumstances); duty to use reasonable
or best efforts (duty of good faith); and adjustment clauses (duty of cooperation).
10 The flexibility and adaptability of contract law is what makes it such a powerful
instrument for a wide range of business transactions. The malleability of contract law is
essential in areas relating to long-term, relational, and joint venture or alliance-type
contracts. In the end smart contracts will likely play an important role, such as the
Internet, in future business transactions, but is unlikely to advance its self-enforcing
and self-remedying features into areas of complex and relational contracts.13
2.1 Smart Contracts + AI = Regulation
11 The above conclusion is made based on the current environment. Some prog-
nosticators see the continued advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the
breakthrough that will elevate smart contracts as the dominant form of future
contracting, severely diminishing the roles of contract law and the legal system.
Currently, AI can be used to conduct specific tasks, but the idea of generalized AI
and its future role is an unknown. Smart contracts technology may be an example of
the first practical use of AI. Proponents of AI see it as the means to reduce waste,
increase efficiency, and increase net utility to society.
However, AI is likely to suffer from the problem of misalignment, which has
been compared to the agency problem often discussed in economics.14 If AI is given
the power to adjust contracts due to extrinsic issues like a change of circumstances
there will be the risk that AI’s value judgment may not align with the values of the
human parties.15 In highly advanced AI, the study of superintelligence focuses on the
ability of AI to strategize in order to achieve goals including its ability ‘to rewrite their
reward functions, alter their hardware, or manipulate humans.’16 Cynics of AI reject it
as a replacement for human action and, more seriously, as an instrument able to make
decisions divergent to a person’s intentions or expectations. This danger of misalign-
ment of values presented by the ‘independence’ of AI, whether related to smart
contract or in other areas, will require new regulations through private law and
governmentally imposed rules. Microsoft, a key player in AI research, has already
13 T. FOLAKE ALABI, ‘Taking Contracting Digital: Examination of the Smart Contracts Experiment’,
p 20, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015843 (accessed 17 June 2018).
14 D. HADFIELD-MENELL & G. HADFIELD, ‘Incomplete Contract and AI Alignment’, Legal Studies
Research Papers Series No. 18-103 (18 April 2018), p 3, https/ssrn.com/abstract=3165793
(accessed 17 June 2018).
15 In the area of robotics, makers of self-driving cars worry about how their machines will perform in
‘edge cases’—complicated and unusual situations that cannot be foreseen during training. ‘The
Kamprad Test’ in THE ECONOMIST 14 (27 April 2018), p 24. This same problem presents itself when
AI is combined with smart contracts.
16 D. HADFIELD-MENELL & G. HADFIELD, ‘Incomplete Contract and AI Alignment’, (18 April 2018) p 9.
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signalled the need for new regulations.17 The role of AI in smart contracting will be
more fully explored in the next section’s discussion of self-driven contracts.
2.2 Self-Sufficient and Self-Driven Contracts
12 Smart contracts are envisioned as potentially eliminating the need for extrinsic
enforcement of legal agreements, thereby making business transactions cheaper,
quicker, and more efficient.18 Economic Forum has speculated that smart contracts
utilizing blockchain technology could codify financial agreements in a shared platform
and guarantee execution.19 But, can one extrapolate the executing of financial agree-
ments without the use of banks to mean that smart contracts in other scenarios can be
used without the need for courts?
The self-sufficient contract is an illusion in cases of contract interpretation, as
well as the applicability of immutable rules. The idea of a self-sufficient contract (fully
comprehensive, perfect clarity) is a cognitive impossibility. The claim that smart con-
tracts can be fully self-executing belies the continuing role of contract law’s interpretive
and remedial functions in all types of contracts—whether smart or ‘dumb.’ The fact that
smart contractsmay be self-executing does notmean that they overcome the problems of
interpretation or prevent the right to seek a remedy in court. Self-enforcement does not
mean that human agents cannot move to block or prevent enforcement. While self-help
remedies can be included in smart contracts, they do not block the use of the range of
remedies that parties may seek under the general law of contracts.
13 If smart contracts are to claim the mantel of a fully self-contained, privatized
legal system, then it will need to be fully self-enforcing and self-remedying. Can all
issues of performance be converted to computer code? Can complicated or complex
contracts be self-enforcing or are smart contracts best suited to certain targeted
transactions such as the execution of financial obligations? Is enforcement of a
smart contract immune from the interpretive problems associated with ordinary
contracts? All of these questions relate to the issue of contract remedies and their
applicability to smart contracts. At the present, the conclusion is that contract law
and judicially created remedies will continue to play a prominent role.
17 Microsoft has produced a 149-page book entitled ‘The Future Computed’. It states that:
‘Companies making and selling AI software will need to be held responsible for potential harm
caused by ‘unreasonable practices.’ D. BASS, ‘Microsoft Says AI Advances Will Require New Laws,
Regulations’, BLOOMBERG TECHNOLOGY (18 January 2018).
18 O’SHIELDS, N.C.B.I. 2017, pp 177–178, citing ‘Not-So-Clever Contracts’, THE ECONOMIST (30 July
2016), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21702758-time-being-least-human-judgment-
still-better-bet-cold-hearted (accessed 17 June 2018).
19 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, ‘The Future of Financial Infrastructure: An Ambitious Look at How
Blockchain Can Reshape Financial Services’, 2016, p 29, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_
The_future_of_financial_infrastructure.pdf (accessed 17 June 2018).
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Anthony Kasey and Anthony Niblett provide one possible glance into the
future. They surmise that the likelihood of needing remedies and the chances of
interpretive misunderstanding are greatly diminished, if nor erased, when smart con-
tracts include the ability to adjust terms through the incorporation of analytics.20 In
what they refer to as ‘self-driving contracts,’ which are based on coded objectives of the
smart contract and where specific terms are filled in post hoc (during performance)
through a variation of big data, analytics, and artificial intelligence.21 Kasey and
Niblett define self-driving contracts as ‘an agreement where (1) the parties set only
broad ex ante objectives; but (2) the contract uses machine-driven analytics and
artificial intelligence to translate the general ex ante objective into a specific term or
directive at the time of performance; where (3) those terms are based on information
gathered after the parties execute the initial agreement.’22
According to Kasey and Niblett, the next generation of smart contracts will only
require the contracting parties to agree on a desired outcome and the allocation of any
future surplus. The contract will then ‘monitor both the external world and the parties’
behaviour. As facts in the world change, the machine updates its directives and breach
is defined as failure to comply with those directives.’23 The parties are then required to
follow the directives or be held in breach of contract. In this way, self-driving contracts
are not self-enforcing as are simpler forms of smart contracts. The difference between
the self-driven contract and traditional contracts is that the former contract contains
fewer possibilities for ambiguities through a post-hoc means of self-correcting or filling
in gaps. Currently, the filling of gaps or clarifying ambiguity in contracts entails high
transaction costs requiring renegotiation by the parties or the resolution of disputes
over meaning through judicial or arbitral proceedings.
Self-driven contracts, however, do not exist and it may be some time before AI
can be used to translate general contract objectives to specific terms. However, it is
likely to be the case that future AI or algorithm learning-driven24 smart contracts will
be disruptive to the exercise of contract law as currently constituted. Core contract
concepts such as consent, definiteness or agreement-in-fact (consent), remedies, as
well as policing doctrines like mutual mistake, the US doctrine of unconscionability,
and the German concept of ‘surprising terms’ may all have to be re-thought.
In this future state, there will remain the possibility of coding errors. Kasey
and Niblett surmise that just as traditional contract doctrine recognizes the prin-
ciple of the scrivener’s error, ‘the law of self-driving contracts will need a doctrine
20 A. KASEY & A. NIBLETT, ‘Self-Driving Contracts’, 43. JCL (The Journal of Corporation Law) 2017,
p 1.
21 Self-driven contracts may be a future end point in the evolution of electronic contracts. See
generally, H. SURDEN, ‘Computable Contracts’, 46. UCDLR (University of Davis Law Review)
2012, p 629 (describing the development of data-oriented and computable digital contracts).
22 KASEY & NIBLETT, JCL 2017, p 3.
23 KASEY & NIBLETT, JCL 2017, p 6.
24 See L. SCHOLZ, ‘Algorithmic Contracts’, 20. STLR (Stanford Technology Law Review) 2017, p 128.
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for coding error to fix obvious mistakes in coding that cause the contract to
glitch.’25 The other concern is the use of such contracts in consumer transactions.
Businesses use of coded contracts with self-correcting algorithms places the con-
sumer at more of a disadvantage as opposed to standard and fixed terms of the
word-based contract. In the end, this may require governmental regulation given
the ‘shrouded nature of the obligation’ in self-driven contracts.26 Finally, the
problem of misalignment of values, discussed in Section 2.1, persists in the self-
driving contract.
2.3 Inflexibility of Smart Contracts
14 Smart contracts are ultimately limited by their inflexibility. One of the
great features of contract law is its inherent flexibility and malleability. It allows
parties to improvise new types of contract terms that are customized to different
types of contracts. In long-term, relational, and complex contracting, the con-
tract is a combination of fixed terms, open-textured rules, and standards.27
Smart contracts currently are only capable of replicating hard or bright line
fixed terms or highly formalized rules. It is no surprise that smart contracts have
first made their mark in financial transactions. Banking and finance laws are
based on highly formalized rules with very little room for adjustment or stan-
dards like reasonableness.28 It is these types of formal rules and terms that are
more easily translatable to code.
15 The shifting away from human-language contracts creates new inefficiencies. It is
extremely costly to form smart contracts in a volatile environment or whenever there’s
a level of uncertainty surrounding the agreement. On the other hand, semantic
contracts are flexible. They enable parties to use performance standards, generally-
25 KASEY & NIBLETT, JCL 2017, p 25.
26 KASEY & NIBLETT, JCL 2017, p 33. See also, K. WERBACH & N. CORNELL, ‘Contracts Ex Machina’, 67.
DLJ (Duke Law Journal) 2017, p (313) at 377.
Indeed, the paradoxical result of smart contracts may be to expand the scope of govern-
ment intervention into technological advancements, which has traditionally been a para-
digmatic environment of private ordering. Once again, the shift from ex post adjudication
to ex ante enforcement creates an inversion. Contracts free individuals to trust each others’
commitments because they can rely on the power of the state to enforce them in cases of
breach. Smart contracts remove the state from adjudication, but in so doing, they create
pressure to reintroduce the state at the front end of the process. The only way to prevent
smart contracts from facilitating illegal or disfavoured conduct is to regulate them.
27 Open-textured rules or terms are those that encourage the interpreter to look to the real world to
find the correct interpretive meaning. The robust use of the reasonableness standard in Art. 2 of
American Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is an example of an open-textured rule. Open-textured
rules allow for the use of contextual input in the defining and application of the rule. See
W. TWINING, Llewellyn Papers (U. Chicago Law School 1968), 86.
28 See UCC Art. 3 (Negotiable Instruments) and Art. 9 (Secured Transactions).
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defined contract terms, to create an enforceable agreement without requiring complete
knowledge of what might happen in the future. Standards also allow parties to
responsively incorporate commercial customs into their agreement, circumventing
the need for explicit but redundant negotiation. And once their agreement is formed
and executed, the parties are nonetheless free to dynamically shape their relationship
through informal modifications or by selectively enforcing breaches. These two forms
of flexibility—linguistic ambiguity and enforcement discretion—create important effi-
ciencies in the contracting process. By eliminating this flexibility, smart contracting
imposes costs that are more severe and intractable than the ones it seeks to solve.29
The inflexibility of smart contracts versus word contracts provides a major
obstacle to smart contracts expansion into the realm of more complex contracting
where self-enforcement and self-remedying features may prove unattractive and
inefficient.30 Some contractual terms simply cannot be expressed through formal
logic, because they imply human judgment. [For example,] a machine has no
precise way to assess whether a party used ‘best efforts’.31 Word contracts help
overcome the unpredictability of future events (change of circumstances) through
provisions, which require a performance adjustment and the appropriate remedial
response that smart contracts are unable to perform. Also, contracts are contextual
endeavours. Business custom and commercial practice are resources that provide
meaning to contracts. Such contextual meaning is lost in the smart contract
because the difficulty and high transaction costs of coding such meaning.32 Thus
the smart contract movement needs to be placed in the context of the complexity of
contracts and the widened variety of contract types not amenable to coding due to
the inflexibility of smart contracts.
3. Smart Contracts as Self-Enforcing and the Continuing Need for
Contract Law Remedies
16 Smart contracts may be outside the law, but they are not above the law. Terms
that are unenforceable at law cannot be legally self-enforced under a smart
contract.33 The use of smart contracts to escape the legal system will not render
29 SKLAROFF, UPLR 2017, p 264 (‘[Semantic contracts enable parties to use performance standards,
generally-defined contract terms, to create an enforceable agreement without requiring complete
knowledge of what might happen in the future.’).
30 Although one commentator notes that a degree of flexibility may be obtained by the use of a
subsequent smart contract to amend or adjust an existing smart contract: ‘One possibility for
achieving the effect of a reversal or change in terms is to create that result through the creation
of a new smart contract which, when added to the existing contracts.’ FARRELL, MACHIN &
HINCHLIFFE, p 6. However, the speed of smart contract execution and the need of the parties to
negotiate to any such changes may prevent a timely adjustment.
31 WERBACH & CORNELL, DLJ 2017, p 365.
32 SKLAROFF, UPLR 2017, p 264.
33 FARRELL, MACHIN & HINCHLIFFE, p 2.
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traditional contractual defenses useless. Smart contracts self-enforcement ability
does not prevent that self-enforcement from being subject to post hoc judicial
review. In such cases, the remedies of restitution and disgorgement of profits
may become more common since performance is not subject to breach.
17 The continuing importance of contract law remedies is supported by the role
of such remedies in ex post adjudication. The ex ante view of contract law with its
focus on the time of contract formation (consent of the parties), which is the
domain of smart contracts, ignores contract law’s ex post regulatory and remedial
function.34 In this regard smart contracts cannot transplant contract law.35
An example of the irreplaceability of contractual remedies can be shown
through a simple example. A transfer of an asset is executed by a smart contract,
but is later invalidated in court due to fraud, duress, incapacity, illegality, and so
forth. In the blockchain the asset remains the property of the transferee, but in
the real world the law recognizes the title being held by the transferor. The only
way to square this bifurcated ownership is for the court to issue an order of
specific performance requiring the transferee to re-convey ownership in the
blockchain.36
18 Finally, the problem of code writing and the possibility of contamination
through a virus may lead to a breach of a smart contract: ‘the code embedding
the contract terms can contain bugs or produce results that are not in accordance
with the expectations of the parties.’37 Therefore, the self-enforcement can be
viewed as a breach in cases where ‘its performance would not be as expected or
intended by the parties.’38 Because of such possibilities, smart contracts may lead
to the recognition of extracontractual legal remedies. The one that comes to mind
is the tort of negligence. The divergence between a smart contract as intended and
expectations of outcome could result in the emergence of torts ‘for negligent
coding or negligent update.’39 One could also imagine cases of intentional miscod-
ing as the basis for an action of misrepresentation or fraud.
34 WERBACH & CORNELL, DLJ 2017, p 361.
35 ‘Smart contracting functions to ensure action. Contract law functions to recognize and remedy
grievances. Smart contracts could not – even in theory – replace contract law.’WERBACH & CORNELL,
DLJ 2017, p 363.
36 A. SAVELYEV, ‘Contract law 2.0: “Smart” contracts as the beginning of the end of classic contract
law’, 26. Information & Communications Technology Law 2017(2), pp 116–134, DOI: 10.1080/
13600834.2017.1301036.
37 S. HOURANI, ‘Cross-Border Smart Contracts: Boosting International Digital Trade Trough Trust and
Remedies’, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Papers_for_Programme/11-
HOURANI-Cross-Border_Smart_Contracts.pdf (accessed 17 June 2018).
38 HOURANI, ‘Cross-Border Smart Contracts: Boosting International Digital Trade Trough Trust and
Remedies’.
39 M. RASKIN, ‘The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts’, GLTR (Georgetown Law Technology
Review) 2017, p (305) at 328.
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3.1 Self-Help Remedies: Self-terminating Software or Shareware
19 Public choice economist Gordon Tullock noted that: ‘We tend to forget that there
is such a thing as technological progress in contracts. People discover new ways of
making agreements, and over a period of time we obtain considerable benefit from this
sort of technological progress.’40 We also tend to forget that there is such a thing as
technological progress in contract remedies. Smart contracts allow lawyers and scho-
lars to realize that contractual remedies are merely tools to be used when helpful. Like
a hammer or a screwdriver, each tool might apply in a different situation. Moreover,
like tools, remedies are subject to innovation. Remedial innovation can stem from the
law or through contract created solutions.
20 It is helpful to consider the opportunities that the parties of smart contracts
exploit, and the arrangements they invent, to enhance the security of their agreements
where no legal remedies for breach exist, or where those that do, are plainly inade-
quate. In particular, scholars in the relational theory of contracts have contributed in
exploring ‘extra-legal or informal devices’ for the regulation of contractual relations.41
In formal relational contracts, standard like provisions such as re-negotiation or re-
opener clauses encourage parties to adjust their contracts according to change of
circumstances in order to preserve their relationships instead of pursuing arbitration
or litigation.42 Outside of the contract, relational (extra-legal) norms such as coopera-
tion, loyalty, and solidarity (trust) emphasize the importance of relationship over the
formal rights and obligations stated in the contract.43 Finally, studies have shown that
entire industries have created their own practices, governance structures, and dispute
resolution processes that make resort to the legal system a rare event.44 Often negative
reputational consequences deter parties from pursuing litigation in order to preserve
40 G. TULLOCK, Private Wants, Public Means: An economic analysis of the desirable scope of govern-
ment (NY: Basic Books 1970).
41 See S. MACAULAY, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’, 28. ASR (American
Sociological Review) 1963, p 55; I.R. MACNEIL, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’, 47. SCLR
(Southern California Law Review) 1974, p 691.
42 When the parties could not agree on changes to the contract, arbitration may represent an option. See,
recently, recently Associated British Ports v Tata Steel UK Ltd [2017] EWHC 694 (Ch), 3 April 2017. A
long-term licence agreement provided that if the parties could not agree on changes to the contract to
reflect a major change in circumstances the matter would be referred to an arbitrator who would decide
the new terms. This was enforceable despite there being no guidance in the contract as to thematters that
were within the scope of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, nor as to the basis on which he or she should amend
the licence.
43 I.R. MACNEIL, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (New Haven:
Yale University Press 1981) (the author argues that modern contracts have more to do with implicit
social relations than the formal contract).
44 L. BERNSTEIN, ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules,
Norms, and Institutions’, 99. UMLR (University of Michigan Law Review) 2001, p 1724 (explores the
private legal system created by the cotton industry in order to opt-out of the formal legal system).
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their status in the community in which they do business.45 Under the traditional view,
legal rules in general, and formal rules of remedies in particular, play a marginal role
in factual settings that fall under the purview of a ‘relational contract’.46
21 A type of extra-legal remedies are self-help remedies, which consist of ‘legally
permissible conduct that individuals undertake absent the compulsion of law and
without the assistance of government officials in efforts to prevent or remedy a civil
wrong.’47 However, these self-administered remedies—such as termination, reduc-
tion of price, set-off and the right to withhold performance of an opposing obliga-
tion—remain susceptible to formal litigation. Self-help remedies are a natural fit
for smart contracts in their quest for self-sufficiency.
As previously noted, it is important to underline that smart contracts’ abilities to
provide self-remedying options do not exclude the traditional remedies offered through
litigation. However, in the words of an author, the remedial perspective with respect to
smart contracts is mainly amatter of ‘private ordering’of the blockchain environment.48
Put differently, traditional remedies, such as damages, specific performance and termi-
nation are harder to apply to blockchain-based contracts.49 This is because of the
problem of identifying pseudonymous parties, finding an appropriate remedy, and
deciding jurisdiction. These problems vary in magnitude and volume depending upon
the types of blockchain networks and environments that underpin the smart contract.
22 In the light of the above, this section constructs a remedial framework for
smart contracting grounded on the current ‘state of knowledge’, while recognizing
that blockchain environments are likely to foster the design of new measures within
the blockchain ecosystems over the coming years. The term ‘measure’ is used here
45 E.g. the losing party in cotton industry arbitration will almost never contest the award through
litigation due to fear if reputational harm and ‘de facto ouster from the industry.’ BERNSTEIN, UMLR
2001, p 1740, fn 73.
46 ‘In a relational contract … it is suggested that legal remedies play a secondary role … and non-legal
factors … play a critical role in the resolution of disputes.’ E. MCKENDRICK, ‘The Regulation of
Long-Term Contracts in English Law’, in J. BEATSON & D. FRIEDMAN (eds), Good Faith and Fault in
Contract Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995) pp (305) at 309–310. See also, I. MACNEIL,
‘Contracts: Adjustment of long-term economic relations under classical, neoclassical, and rela-
tional contract law’, 79. NWULR (Northwestern University Law Review) 1978, p 854 (Ian Macneil
is considered the father of relational contract theory).
47 M.P. GERGEN, ‘A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in Contract’, 89. Boston U. L. Rev. 2009, p 1397.
D.I. BRANDON ET AL., ‘Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary
American Society’, 37. VLR (Vanderbilt Law Review) 1984, p (845) at 850 (self-help remedies
include liquidated damage, self-help repossession, and arbitration).
48 O. WILLIAMSON, ‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange’, 73. AER (American
Economic Review) 1983, p 519.
49 E.g. laws cannot be easily applied to blockchain users in different countries, since each geographic
jurisdiction has its own separate legal system, and there is little chance of forcing a person from the
Internet (especially if they are anonymous) to appear in court in a different country. S. ROWAN,
Remedies for Breach of Contract (Oxford: OUP 2012), p 265.
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instead of ‘remedy’ to distinguish traditional approaches to breach of contract and
contractual remedies with those relating to self-help remedies developed with
blockchain technology.50 It recognizes that smart contracts are likely to develop
within the scope of blockchain ecosystems, with traditional contract remedies
acting in default. This is because self-executing technologies necessarily focus on
ex ante compliance rather than on ex post enforcement measures.51
23 Internal smart contract remedies can be divided into two types—proactive and
reactive measures. The next two sections will explore proactive and reactive measures.
Proactive measures include, but are not limited to, data security and integrity, making
non-performance or breach technologically impossible, and opt-out provisions tailored
to minimize the loss to one of the parties. Reactive measures include, for example,
trust, reputation, and social repudiation. Other technology-centred remedies include
the use of private (‘expert oracles’) or public authorities (‘public super-user’) with the
ability to modify the content of blockchain ecosystem in case of fraud or mistake.52
3.2 Proactive Measures
24 Smart contracts are immutable, meaning that the code by default cannot be
changed. One of the most compelling reasons for the use of smart contracts is their
ability to lessen the likelihood of breaches. This is based upon the assumption that the
electronic format and Boolean logic remove the need for nuance and interpretation by
eradicating the ambiguity found in traditional contracts. Also, by automating the
contractual exchange opportunistic breach is precluded. Moreover, non-legal remedies
can be programmed into the smart contract in the event of a coding error or breach.
Proactive remedies include procedures that render breach technically impos-
sible or, alternatively, providing ex ante for a party to exit the contract with a specified
loss. In other words, these measures protect the security of a blockchain transaction.53
By using smart contracts, the parties aim at changing the paradigm of contract practice
from ex post authoritative judgment to ex ante-automated assessments. Parties that
50 N. SZABO, ‘Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks’ (1 September 1997),
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469-publisher=First (accessed 20
June 2018) (author uses the word ‘measures’).
51 A. NARAYANAN, ‘The Future of Bitcoin?’, YouTube (27 April 2015), https://youtu.be/YG7l0XPtzD4
(accessed 20 June 2018). Smart contracts seek to insulate performance from outside intervention: ‘To
maintain knowledge and control, performancemust be encapsulated: protected from outside influences,’
such as third-party claims. N. SZABO, ‘Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks’, 2.
First Monday (1997), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548 (accessed 17 June
2018).
52 A. SAVELYEV, ICTL, p 22.
53 N. SZABO, ‘Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets’, 1996, http://www.fon.hum.uva.
nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.
vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html (accessed 17 June 2018).
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use smart contracts believe that the ex ante automated results will only infrequently
diverge from an authoritative decision maker such as a judge. In this way, the parties
deliberately preclude ex-post corrections for the sake of ex ante efficiency. In other
words, parties to smart contracts re-design the contractual framework to increase legal
certainty by agreeing up-front to abide the contracts’ automated conclusions.54
3.3 Reactive Measures
25 The benefits of self-enforcement include lower transaction costs and certainty
of performance. However, the immutability of smart contracts presents a special
challenge for programmers. In writing a smart contract, correctness matters a great
deal since the consequences of bad code writing can be dire. ‘Bugs’ are inherent in
computer code so the effectiveness of smart contracts is dependent on the careful
writing of code, since errors cannot be fixed after the fact.
Two authors suggest that blockchain autonomy might be tempered with fuller
consideration of the human side of business dealings including the loss of a blockchain
private key,55 receipt of a defective product, the ability to show ownership, to invoke
state consumer protection rights, or the need to verify title to land before entering a
transaction on the blockchain.56 Smart contracts cannot access outside information
unless it is written into the blockchain.57 One commentator provides this example:
[By] setting up a blockchain based land register on a server or coding smart contract to
be recorded as a transaction on a blockchain applicationmay prove to be the easy part.
Verifying that a person claiming that he has title to a piece of land or verifying that the
holder of a public key is who he claims to be, will often be an impossible task (…).58
In other words, by nature, ‘smart contracts’ are limited in their functionality since they
cannot deal with ambiguity, programmers cannot plan for every contingency, nor do
they have the capability of translating a complete set of the real-world data to respond
54 A. ROBINSON & T. HINGLEY, Smart Contracts: The Next Frontier?, Oxford Law Faculty Business Law
Blog (23 May 2016), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2016/05/smart-contracts-
next-frontier (accessed 20 June 2018).
55 A private key is a secret code that authenticates your ownership of resources on the blockchain.
56 J. GRIMMELMANN & A. NARAYANAN, The Blockchain Gang, Slate (16 February 2016), http://www.slate.
com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/02/bitcoin_s_blockchain_technology_won_t_
change_everything.html (accessed 20 June 2018).
57 For instance, a smart contract by itself has no access to weather data. To condition a contract on the
temperature, e.g. there must be a third party that takes the data from a weather API and writes it to
the blockchain in a way that is accessible to other users. This trusted data source is called an oracle.
58 M. VON HALLER GRONBAEK, Blockchain 2.0, Smart Contracts and Challenges, Working Paper (2016),
http://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/uk/blockchain-2-0–smart-contracts-and-chal
lenges (accessed 16 June 2018).
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to future events.59 In this sense, one may conclude, contrary to the claims of promoters
of blockchain technologies the rule of the word cannot be fully replaced by the rule of
the code.60 This implies that a proactive (ex ante) approach many not be sufficient in
all cases. Thus, contrary to the myth of self-enforcement, the design of reactive
measures is inevitable. Reactive measures for smart contracts include, for example,
trust, reputation, and social repudiation, as discussed below.
3.3.1 Trust
26 Trust is the bedrock of contracting, especially in long-term contracts. Contracting
parties might make promises, but given the opportunity, might break them and pursue
their own self-interests. However, business deals depend on being able to trust that a
promise will be kept. Does blockchain technology act as a substitute for trust due to its
immutability? An affirmative answermakes smart contracting a temptingmeans of doing
business. It should be reiterated that, in blockchain environments, each member main-
tains his own copy of the information, and members must validate any updates collec-
tively. The information could represent transactions, contracts, assets, identities, or
practically anything else that can be described in digital form. Entries are permanent,
transparent, and searchable, which makes it possible for community members to view
transactional histories. Each update is a new ‘block’ added to the end of the ‘chain.’ A
protocol manages new edits or entries, validate, record, and distribute the new blocks.
Thus, cryptology replaces third-party intermediaries as the keeper of trust as blockchain
participants by running complex algorithms certify the integrity of the whole blockchain
and its embedded information. But, the blockchain cannot be a complete surrogate for
trust because human actors still play crucial roles as programmers, develops, and as
owners or managers of electronic platforms.61
3.3.2 Reputation
27 Reputation is invaluable in small communities with repeated transactions (like
private blockchain environments). Parties not conforming to communal norms or
breach contracts suffer negative reputation consequences resulting in exclusion from
future interactions. Thus, it is in parties’ self-interest to build a reputation of reliability,
honesty, and fair dealing.
59 E. MIK, ‘Smart contracts: Terminology, technical limitations and real world complexity’, 9. LIT
(Law, Innovation and Technology) 2017, p 269.
60 A. WRIGHT & P. DE FILIPPI, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code (Cambridge: 2018);
A. WRIGHT & P. DE FILIPPI, ‘Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex
Cryptographia’ (10 March 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 (last assessed 15 May
2018) and http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2580664 (accessed 17 June 2018).
61 Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’, p 9, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
(accessed 20 June 2018) (summarizes the Bitcoin project ‘as system for electronic transactions without
relying on trust’). R. JACKSON, ‘After Facebook’s PrivacyDebacle,HowBlockchainWill SecureOurDigital
Lives’, (3 April 2018), https://cryptoslate.com/facebook-privacy-debacle (accessed 20 June 2018).
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However, integrity and reputation are of little importance in blockchain
transactions. Misbehaving parties can simply erase their history by creating a new
pseudonym.62 In contrast, most people that conduct business over the Internet are
more interested in interconnectedness that results from the exchange than in the
legal consequences of their transactions. This can be seen in the way that people rate
their experiences on eBay, Uber, and TripAdvisor. Users of these services rate their
experiences with the vendors based on the quality and timeliness of the service or
delivery of the product. These ratings create a reputation for the service provider and
build relationships of trust in the network or community. Thus even though the
participants never meet, their interactions are based on each other’s status in the
community, rather than the strict legal rights expressed in terms and conditions.63
In fact, participants use a variety of tools to promote their ‘reputations’ in
a decentralized blockchain. ‘Uprightly’ is an example. It is a decentralized reputa-
tion protocol empowers users to build their reputation with reviews and
encourages cooperation in all marketplaces.64 Those who use this system make
it easier for users to submit reviews relating to the platform and efficiently search
for reviews of the platform. This way, users can become a market participant and
safeguard their interests in the process. Further, Uprightly encourages and incen-
tive structure so that users can apply this system, and benefit from it as well. It
requires no third-party intervention. It is censorship-resistant and decentralized
as well.
3.3.3 Social repudiation: ‘hard-forking’65
28 The DAO incident66 involved the stealing of fifty million dollars of Ether
cryptocurrency and ultimately led the Ethereum community to rescind (hard-fork)
62 N. NISAN, T. ROUGHGARDEN, É. TARDOS, V.V. VAZIRANI & C.H. PAPADIMITRIOU, Algorithmic Game Theory
(Cambridge: CUP 2008), p 682. Being able to cheaply create a new pseudonym in order to dodge a
bad reputation is called whitewashing. One response is to distrust newcomers since their identities
may mask a bad reputation or to require that pseudonyms be linked to a real person or business.
63 W.L. FELSTINER, R.L. ABEL, & A. SARAT, ‘The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming…’ 15. LSR (Law & Society Review) 1980, p 631.
64 ‘Uprightly’ is discussed at https://bitcoinexchangeguide.com/uprightly-ico-upt-token/ (accessed 17
June 2018).
65 Hard-forking refers to:
A hard fork or hardfork, as it relates to blockchain technology, is a radical change to the protocol that
makes previously invalid blocks/transactions valid (or vice-versa). This requires all nodes or users to
upgrade to the latest version of the protocol software. Put differently, a hard fork is a permanent
divergence from the previous version of the blockchain, and nodes running previous versions will no
longer be accepted by the newest version.
Investopedia at https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hard-fork.asp#ixzz5E3U9U2Pg
(assessed 20 June 2018).
66 The DAO is a digital Decentralized Autonomous Organization, and a form of investor-directed
venture capital fund. The DAO had an objective to provide a new decentralized business
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the blockchain (violating the underlying principle of distributed ledger technology).
Interestingly, the taking of Ether did not constitute a breach since the hacker
followed DAO rules but in a strategic and malicious manner. The ETH community’s
hard-fork was a way to protect the agreement (crowd-sourced venture capital), but
it did so via social repudiation (breach) of the ‘contract’ itself. While ‘hard-forking’
is not a readily available contract remedy (although it may be subject to specific
performance order), it provides an extra-legal measure to correct errors or manip-
ulation of the blockchain.
3.3.4 Blockchain Community and Contractual Measures
29 This preliminary analysis of the state of the art concerning proactive and
reactive measures points out the ‘centrality’ of the blockchain community in
preventing or when necessary reacting to vitiating elements, such as breach,
eavesdropping, and interference in smart contracts. The blockchain is described
as a community since the participants believe in a similar cause: the use of
technology to ensure transparency, trust, and anonymity (decentralization).
Importantly, blockchain environments can be customized to reflect the needs of
different types of participants. For example, blockchain environments can be
private with restricted membership (known as ‘permissioned blockchains’) or
they can be accessible to any person in the world (‘unpermissioned blockchains’).
There are also ‘consortium blockchains’ where the process of validating transac-
tions is controlled by a fixed set of nodes.
30 Blockchain ecosystems can be conceived as ‘tribes’ that allow its members to
trust one another, much like the Maghribi traders of the eleventh-century.67
Maghribis coalitions established informal mechanisms (measures) to prevent
breach of contracts. These measures included trust, reputation, and exclusion
from the social group. Contemporary traders rely on trust in coding, oracles and
their ecosystems to avoid what is perceived as an overregulated world, and are,
thus, likely to seek out remedies or, more specifically, measures within their
blockchain communities.
model for organizing both commercial and non-profit enterprises. It was instantiated on the
Ethereum blockchain. The DAO raises funds and ‘members’ write smart contracts to manage
the investing of the funds. A hacker managed to create a parallel DAO and stole 3.6 million
units of Ether (cryptocurrency).
67 A. GRIEF, ‘Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders’ 49.
JEH (Journal of Economic History) 1989, p 857 (discusses ‘informal contract-enforcement mechan-
ism based on multilateral relationships within a closely-knit ‘coalition’). See also, A. GRIEF,
‘Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’
Coalition’, 83. AER (American Economic Review) 1993, p 525; A. GRIEF, Institutions and the
Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge: CUP 2006).
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4. Concluding Remarks
31 Given the great variety of contract types, smart contracts are currently limited to
simplistic, mostly financial, types of transactions.68 This is not to say smart contracts
and blockchain technology are not major advancements and that they are not likely
to play bigger roles in future contracting. But, currently the use of smart contracts in
more complex transactions is limited to a piecemeal approach. They can be used to
execute certain obligations within the framework of a more complex word contract.69
Some obligations can be efficiently coded, others cannot; smart contracts can be used
to execute fixed, formal components of a contract, but the flexibility needed in long-
term or relational contracts would need to remain in word form.
32 The point here is that reliance on formal remedies is less frequent in smart
contracts. In particular, it will be important to monitor the emergence of
measures (proactive and reactive) aimed at preventing or (when necessary)
responding to vitiating elements (manipulation, errors in coding), breach,
eavesdropping, and interference in smart contracts, as well as extracontractual
or business responses, before resort is made to contract law and the legal
system. The article develops a preliminary categorization and analysis of proac-
tive and reactive measures that are available to the users of the blockchain and
their communities.
33 Such measures may diminish the use of the formal legal system, but they
cannot transplant the legal system or prevent the use of the legal system to obtain
contractual remedies. Smart contracts cannot avoid law, as coded terms remain
subject to review of the courts. This is especially in cases where codes terms do not
comply with the mandatory provisions of the law, for example, in the case of EU
consumer law. Smart contracts also remain subject to contract laws policing doc-
trines, such as mistake, duress or coercion, ‘surprising terms’ (if the smart contract
incorporates stand terms),70 misrepresentation or fraud, as well as implied in law
terms, such as the duty of good faith and the duty of reasonable efforts in agency
contracts.
68 See e.g. John ARMOUR asserts that: ‘the foreseeable future will confine smart contracts to simplistic
types of transactions. In more complex transactions, the word contract will remain dominant,
however, portions of such contracts may be allocated to smart contract technology’. J. ARMOUR,
‘Mechanisation of Law’, https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-and-subject-groups/research-collec
tion-law-and-technology/blog/2017/03/mechanisation-law (accessed 3 March 2017).
69 Anil Awasthi discusses such as scenario: ‘Smart legal contracts would contain a combination of
smart contract code and more traditional legal language.’ A. AWASTHI, ‘Revolutionary’ Smart
Contracts Automate Trust’, 1. AB (American Banker) Bank Technology Section (9 September
2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/revolutionary-smart-contracts-automate-
trust (accessed 17 June 2018).
70 See e.g. s. 305c of the German Civil Code (‘Provisions [that are] are so unusual that the contractual
partner of the user could not be expected to have reckoned with them, do not formpart of the contract.’).
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34 Self-enforcement is not a panacea against judicial intervention. In the end,
self-enforcement will not prevent a party from seeking redress through litigation or
arbitration. The need for redress may be predicated upon the occurrence of unex-
pected events that appear after the conclusion of the smart contract, which change
the contractual balance. Once there is litigation or arbitration then contract law’s
remedial scheme is re-engaged.
